A methodology for studying design cognition
in the real world
The in vivo research methodology holds promise to
improve some of the limitations of typical design
cognition methodologies. Whereas typical design
cognition methodology use protocol analysis
(utilizing special ‘think-aloud’ instructions and/or
artificial settings) or retrospective analyses, in vivo
research attempts to study design thinking and
reasoning ‘live’ or ‘online’ as it takes place in the real
world. No special instructions are used since the
method relies on natural dialogue taking place
between designers. By recording verbalizations at
product development meetings (or other suitable
objects of study), transcribing, and coding the data, it
is possible to test hypotheses about design cognition
in the real-world. This promises to improve the
ecological validity over typical design cognition
studies. Problems with the methodology include
labor-intensiveness leading to small samples (possible
sampling errors). To deal with this problem, it is
recommended to supplement in vivo research with
traditional larger sample laboratory studies.
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Design activity includes cognitive processes such as problem
solving and creativity [9], making the design domain an
obvious choice (along with science and art) when cognitive
scientists want to explore higher cognitive functions. Although
it has been proposed that design problem solving may differ in
some respects from other kinds of problem solving, the
distinctions are not always sharp enough to warrant a domainindependent theory of design problem solving [43]. This led
Zimring & Craig [43] to argue for a design research á la carte,
treating design problem solving as problem solving in general,
and to focus on the reasoning processes involved (such as
analogy, mental simulation, argumentation, decision making,
synthesis) as these processes help construct novel and useful
artifacts. Such research could potentially contribute to
theoretical development in cognitive science, and facilitate the
development of problem solving and creativity research that
can cross narrow design disciplinary boundaries.
Studies attempting to examine design cognition usually employ
methodologies such as protocol analysis, questionnaires, and
interviews. Retrospective or anecdotal evidence (such as
historical analyses, interviews, dairy studies or questionnaires
about design processes) from designers has been used to try to
pinpoint the cognitive mechanisms behind design cognition.
These retrospective methods are however very unreliable when
dealing with cognitive mechanisms where the subject cannot
be expected to have accurate memory of – or perhaps even
conscious access to - what exactly is going on in the process
[32]. For example, research on cognition in science has shown
that conscious reconstruction of the steps that led to a
discovery did not include significant elements and mechanisms
that were recorded by a present observer [12]. Subjects’ poor
memory of the steps and mechanisms involved in creative
processes, as well as their inability to accurately reconstruct the
events, should be taken into account in the methodology used
to study such phenomena. Further, retrospective studies often
provide a highly filtered view of the subjects cognitive
processes, making them problematic in studies of the processes
and mechanisms in design cognition. Therefore, it has been
recommended that design cognition be studied using ‘live’ or
‘on-line’ research methods.
In fact, design cognition has used a particular ‘on-line’
methodology (protocol analysis) in the past 30 years [7], where
subjects are instructed to ‘think-aloud’ while solving design
problems. The use of protocol analysis seems to have increased
in recent years. Ericsson & Simon [19,20] developed thinkaloud protocols, and argued that they did not significantly
interfere with, and could accurately report the content of short
term memory, and thereby reveal the processes going on in
regular problem solving.

Eastman [18] studying architecture was the first to conduct a
protocol analysis in design, and since that time protocol
analysis has been used to study for example, goal analysis, coevolution of problem and solution, fixation and attachment to
concepts, the role of sketching, opportunism, and modal shifts
[see 8 for a review]. In 1994 the second Delft Workshop was
entitled ‘Research in Design Thinking II – Analysing Design
Activity’ [9] and focused exactly on protocol analysis. Here a
number of design researchers were asked to analyze the same
verbal protocols derived from experimental studies of
designers. The outcome of this workshop appears to have given
protocol analysis a boost in the design literature.
But even the ‘online’ methodology of protocol analysis is
problematic as a methodology to study design cognition. A
major part of protocol analysis studies focus on single subjects
verbalizing concurrently while performing a given task. In this
type of study, the subjects are given special ‘think-aloud’
instructions to verbalize all that is currently going through their
head while performing the task. These instructions force the
subjects to verbalize, and if they grow quite for short periods of
time, the experimenter will remind them to ‘please, think
aloud’ or ‘keep talking’. Recent research has shown that
forcing subjects to verbalize during problem solving can
interfere with performance or change cognitive behavior
[10,29]. Schooler et al. showed that not only may forced
‘think-aloud’ protocols be inaccurate in reporting what is going
on in creative cognition by interfering with non-verbal
modalities [33], but they are also detrimental to the very
creative process they seek to study [34]. In a number of
experiments, Schooler et al. [34] showed that think-aloud
protocols apparently interfered with subjects’ abilities to solve
insight problems. The results could not be explained merely
with respect to the conscious effort necessary to perform verbal
‘online’ self-reports of cognitive processes. Somehow forced
think-aloud protocols interfered with (‘overshadowed’) the
creative processes going on. Thus it seems that forced
verbalizations are problematic in the study of at least some
types of cognition.
Further, the typical protocol analysis study employs an
experimental laboratory setup using relatively simple and
artificially constructed design tasks [8] with a very short time
span (typically less than 2 hours) using subjects (sometimes
non-experts) working on their own [2]. This obviously
contrasts with real-world design where the typical design task
is highly complex and may span months or years. In real world
design the contextual setting is typically social and team-based,
but most protocol analysis studies use individuals working on
their own, and even protocol analysis studies using team-based
interactions often utilize teams of strangers, depriving the
designers of their persistent social network and normal
interaction partners. In the real world, the individual expert
designers work in a personally tuned environment (e.g., their
own office) with personalized tools etc [7], unlike the
laboratory where they are asked to function without such tools.
Since experts rely on external aids such as drawings and notes
[31], it becomes increasingly important to incorporate such
aids and tools in the study of design cognition, rather than
focusing on verbalizations alone [5]. Further, in experimental
settings the experimenter is frequently used as ‘the client’, but
interaction between designer and ‘client’ is restricted to
scripted and prefabricated responses to anticipated design
questions thus prohibiting more natural conversations and a
meaningful image of the client [7]. These experimental settings
employed in the typical protocol analysis study have been
found to have a heavy influence on the protocol data [9]. In
contrast, several theorists have argued that understanding
situated behavior is essential for framing research on cognition
[27,36,28], and it is somewhat paradoxical that given the
highly contextualized nature of design activity, research on

design expertise have typically ignored the role of situational
and social factors to conduct laboratory style investigations
where such factors are controlled for. This led [2,1] to call for
an applied or cognitive ethnography in the study of design
cognition. Thus, protocol analysis studies of design seem to cry
out for more ecologically valid research about how the design
process takes place in the real-world.
Taking this criticism of protocol analysis into account, it is
necessary to study the creative process ‘online’ in other ways
than through forced ‘think-aloud’ protocols conducted in the
laboratory. One such ‘online’ methodology would be to study
the creative process, as it occurs ‘live’ in the real-world.
Dunbar [e.g., 11,12,14,16,17] has recently created a
methodology for studying cognition in science, called the in
vivo-in vitro method. The name is borrowed from the
biologist’s vocabulary on biology research. For example, a
virus can be examined both in the Petri dish (‘in vitro’) and
when it infects a host organism (‘in vivo’). Similarly, Dunbar
proposes, the same cognitive processes can be examined both
in the laboratory, using controlled experiments, and as they
occur ‘live’ in the real-world. This allows the cognitive
researcher to investigate a phenomenon in a naturalistic
fashion, and then go back into the psychological laboratory and
conduct controlled experiments on what has been identified in
the naturalistic settings [16]. This way, the methodology
attempts to maintain both the ecological validity highlighted as
essential by a number of researchers [e.g., 30,27,6], as well as
the experimental rigor that is possible in the psychological
laboratory. In vivo research makes use of so-called messy data
[5], which refers to such things as verbalizations, observations,
videotapes and gestures studied in naturalistic settings. The in
vivo – in vitro approach has been used with success in studying
expertise in scientific domains such as physics, fMRi research,
and astronomy [37,38,39,40,42], as well as other domains of
expertise, such as meteorology and submarine operations [41].
Until now the methodology has not been applied in the study of
design. But recently the present author has used this
methodology to study engineering design cognition, and below
I will focus on the in vivo part of this methodology, and show
how it can be used to study design cognition while avoiding
some of the limitations and pitfalls of the usual design
cognition methodologies.
IN VIVO RESEARCH ON DESIGN

The present version of in vivo research was constructed to
study design cognition – notably thinking and reasoning - as it
takes place in naturalistic design situations amongst expert
practicing engineering designers. I identified a major
international company working in medical plastics who had
shown consistent design skill and creativity over a number of
years. The product development department had won multiple
design awards. The company agreed to take part in this study,
and I was given access to the company and all aspects relating
to a particular design project that was about to start up
(spanning more than 2 years), including interviews with
members of the project, access to the product database, email
correspondence, access to meetings at all levels, including
brainstorming meetings, observations of end-user product
evaluation sessions, decision making meetings at both the
micro and macro level, and more. I followed the design project
for the first 8 months (primarily the concept design phase) of
the design project. Initially a number of interviews were
conducted to familiarize myself with the company and the way
the project I would be following was organized. The goal was
to identify points in time where creative design thinking occurs
and capture this on audio or video tapes that could then be
analyzed for the processes involved in the thinking and
reasoning in design cognition. The time points in question
would preferably be recurrent on a regular basis (e.g.,

occurring at regular times every week) and contain a crosssection of design activities, so as to allow for the study of
multiple different design activities, allow for analysis of
development over time (i.e., development across different time
points as the design process progressed), and allow for the
practical issue that I could schedule attendance to these time
points in advance, rather than having to be present at the
company at all times, as would frequently be the case in
ethnographic studies. Further, the time point should be set in a
group setting to ensure that natural dialogue would take place.
Dunbar [11,12] had discovered that in the domain of molecular
biology, a suitable time point was the regularly scheduled
laboratory meetings held by many scientists, especially in the
natural sciences. Lab meetings consist of a senior scientist
along with his or her Post Doc.s and PhD students, and Dunbar
found that lab meetings contain a range of cognitive activities,
such as hypothesis generation, proposal of new experiments
and criticism of existing ones, and sometimes the development
of entirely new concepts. He found that these meetings “...
provided a far more veridical and complete record of the
evolution of ideas than other sources of information” [16]. This
made the lab meetings well suited as an object of study where
science could be studied in a naturalistic context.

these subgroup product development meetings to find out how
much of the time was allocated to design thinking and
reasoning. The average results indicated that, in the meetings I
observed, 6% of the time concerned off-task verbalizations
(such as office gossip, jokes, banter between the designers),
3% were spent summarizing the findings of past meetings
(usually at the beginning of the meeting), 3% were spent
planning future meetings (typically at the end of the meeting),
10% concerned planning future data collection or experiments,
and a full 78% of the meetings concerned design thinking and
reasoning in the here-and-now. Thus, the majority of the time
spent on these meetings appeared to focus on design thinking
and reasoning. Note that these exact percentages would
probably be somewhat different in a different organizational
context, different design project, or different phase of the
design process than I studied. These percentages are merely to
illustrate that this particular object of study is promising in the
study of design thinking and reasoning, in that it captures
relatively little irrelevant data, and looking for similar objects
of study in other design projects holds promise. Further, it is
meant to illustrate that it may be beneficial to conduct tests of
how much irrelevant data one is likely to capture given a
particular object of study.

An analogous object of study in engineering design turned out
to be product development meetings. The design project I
would be studying incorporated 19 people who were loose or
permanent members of the project. This large group was also
organized into smaller units focusing on different aspects of the
overall design. For example, one such sub-group focused on
producing completely novel features of the product, and
consisted of 5 core members (representing multidisciplinary
functions, e.g., engineering, architecture, production). This
subgroup (like all the subgroups involved in the project) held
weekly product development meetings. Because the designers
were talking out loud there was an external record of thinking
and reasoning. Thus by recording product development
meetings it is possible to gain access to ‘online’ thinking and
reasoning without influencing the way the designers think.
Using this method it is possible to directly monitor thinking
and reasoning rather than uncovering reasoning through posthoc interviews, questionnaires or think aloud protocols [12].
Pilot studies in these subgroup product development meetings
showed that the design activity taking place in these groups
consisted of a broad cross-section of what characterizes design
thinking and reasoning in general. The primary function of
these subgroup product development meetings were creative
development of design artifacts – that is actual creating and
problem solving in collaboration – and the activity included
brainstorming, concept development, design problem solving,
planning of data collection and the next steps of design
process, testing and evaluating mock-ups and prototypes,
sketching activity, experiments, discussions and knowledge
exchange about end-users, production methods and more.

Besides these subgroup product development meetings, other
types of meetings were also held, carrying different functions.
For example, leaders of each subgroup would meet with the
head of the design project on a bimonthly basis to discuss
strategy and status of the project. But pilot studies of these
strategy meetings revealed that the content of these meetings to
a much lesser extent focused on thinking and reasoning about
creating design artifacts. The subgroup product development
meetings were thus selected as a highly suitable object of
study. It’s content including a broad cross section of design
activities in general, design thinking and reasoning occupied
the vast majority of the time at these meetings, the regularity of
the meetings, and the activity was team based and included a
suitable number of people (typically 4-6) to allow for
meaningful interaction. These types of product development
meetings appear to be somewhat typical in engineering design
teams, and there is no reason to assume that this highly suitable
object of study is special for the organization or design project
I was studying.

A concern when conducting in vivo research is that because
such research takes place in a naturalistic environment, it is
likely that large amounts of irrelevant data will be captured. A
risk facing the in vivo researcher is that of drowning in
irrelevant data. Unlike artificial experimental settings, where
the experimenter actively sets up a very particular task and
context to study a particular phenomenon, in vivo research has
to try to locate a suitable object of study in the real world. This
approach is likely to capture irrelevant data that has to be
weeded out during an often quite extensive data collection and
data analysis work load. To reduce this concern of capturing
too much irrelevant data, it is important to pick the object of
study carefully, so that the captured irrelevant data can be kept
to a minimum, and drowning in data can be avoided. To
examine whether the subgroup product development meetings
primarily concerned design cognition, I coded for content in

DATA COLLECTION

In vivo research requires a great deal of background knowledge
of the domain in question, since the data involves experts
thinking and reasoning about their usual tasks. Therefore it is
necessary for the researcher to develop knowledge of the basic
vocabulary and structure of the task, in order to understand
what is going on. Therefore I conducted interviews with
members of the subgroup as well as the project leader to
familiarize myself both with the type of design product in
question, the organization of the project and subgroup, the
nature and steps of the design process about to begin and so on.
Further, I read information about existing products in the same
domain, sat in on strategy and decision making meetings,
conducted pilot studies and in other ways familiarized myself
with the domain and typical design process, and the vocabulary
and habits of the designers that I could expect to encounter.
Following this initial data gathering and familiarization, I
started to collect data on the object of study (the subgroup
product development meetings).
Prior to each meeting, I conducted a semi-structured interview
with one of the designers to find out what the status of the
project was, what was going to be the topics of today’s
meeting, and what they were currently working on, along with
any design problems they were having. I then attended the
meeting as an observer only. The meeting was videotaped, and
the conversation between the designers was audio taped. When

recording in vivo there appears to be a tradeoff between
amount of data that can be collected, and the invasiveness of
the data collection procedure (that can potentially influence the
process if the designers become too self-conscious or stressed
of being recorded). A non-invasive method is audio-taping
only, which obviously lacks a lot of potentially important
information about design objects present, motor activities and
gestures, gaze of the designers etc, while capturing only
verbalizations. A highly invasive method collecting some of
this potentially important data could involve multiple cameras
set to record total-room view, desk-tops, gestures of individual
designers, and details of any note-taking or sketching behavior.
Such an approach will probably influence the behavior of the
designers, unless care is taking to hide all recording equipment
as much as possible and allow for long trial periods to allow
the participants to adapt to the artificial feel of the situation. I
chose to collect an amount of data that would be relatively noninvasive, while still collecting most of the important variables.
A single camera was set up high above and a short distance
from the table where the designers sat during the meeting, but
zoomed in so that all objects on the table could be discerned,
and all sketching and note-taking activities could be captured,
albeit not in detail. All people present were in the frame to
allow for an examination of who was currently talking if this
could not be discerned on the audiotape. Bodily gestures and
general gaze could be discerned most but not all the time,
depending on bodily posture of the individual designers (e.g.,
gaze could not be perfectly discerned when looking away from
the camera). Facial expressions could not be discerned. An
omnibus microphone linked to the videotape was placed center
table to allow for recording of all verbalizations.
No special instructions (e.g., instructions to ‘think-aloud’) were
given to participants at the meeting – they were simply
informed that they should proceed with the meeting as they
normally would. As an observer I took notes of information not
readily available in the video frame, and collected any
handouts. Following each meeting all mock-up and prototypes
that had been present during the meeting was videotaped in
close-up, sometimes with one of the designers explaining in
voice-over the function of the object. Sketches were also
recorded or copied when possible. This, together with the
videotape, allowed for noting what design object (e.g., sketch,
prototype or part of sketch) was currently being referenced in
the verbalizations. The interviews and additional information
gathered provided supplemental sources of information. The
primary object of study was the videotaped meetings.
DATA ANALYSIS

Following data collection all verbalizations are transcribed.
Once transcribed, the data can then be analyzed as a series of
statements following standard verbal protocol analysis fashion
[20]. These statements can potentially reveal a lot about the
cognitive mechanisms operating during the creative and
reasoning processes, as Dunbar [3,4,12,13,15] has shown. The
transcription process is time consuming, and typically takes 710 hours labor per hour of video/audio.
The transcribed data can then be segmented (divided into units)
according to a suitable grain size (i.e., size of each segment,
such as proposition, sentence, episode). For much design
thinking and reasoning research, such a grain size could be
dividing the data into ‘complete thought’ segments [e.g., 26].
This entails separating verbal statements into segments
containing verb phrases which are indicative of mental
operations. Each segment will typically be either a single
sentence or fraction of a sentence, yielding hundreds of
segments per hour of recording. Each segment can then be
given a time stamp, and additional non-verbal codes can be
added to segments if necessary (e.g., gaze, gestures, referenced

object, and so on can be coded from the video data). These
segments are the primary unit of analysis.
In order to test hypotheses and theories of design thinking and
reasoning, a coding scheme has to be developed. It is very
difficult to convey the steps involved in choosing specific
codes, since it depends entirely on the researcher’s theoretical
orientation, the hypotheses or questions being asked, the task
and domain [5]. Developing and operationalizing a coding
scheme is a task too complex to be described here in detail, but
in essence this coding scheme development procedure follows
standard verbal protocol analysis, and the reader is referred to
Ericsson & Simon [20] for more details. Rather, I will provide
an extended example from ongoing research on engineering
design illustrating different types of codes in the next section.
Choosing a coding scheme should be done a priori so as to
reduce the chance that post hoc theory will influence the data
[20], but the first theory-laden choice of coding scheme may be
too general for application on particular verbal data. Therefore,
once having chosen a coding scheme, it needs to be decided
what verbalizations in the data constitute evidence that they
can be translated into a particular code. In other words, the
codings should be operationalized in relation to the context and
type of data at hand. For example, if one wants to study
differences in analogical distance between different analogies
in the verbalizations, it is one thing to have a general
theoretically interesting distinction between ‘local’ analogies
and ‘distant’ analogies, and quite another to know how to code
for this distinction in a particular data set. In molecular
biology, Dunbar [11,12] operationalized this distinction by
creating three categories: ‘within organism’, ‘between
organism’ and ‘non-biological or distant’ analogies.
A few general comments of special relevance to in vivo data
should be noted here. First, in vivo data is typically much less
specific than data collected under artificial constraints in the
experimental laboratory. This means that somewhat large
amounts of irrelevant data will be present – even when care is
taking in selecting relevant objects of study. This irrelevant
data can be weeded out by applying preliminary codes that
focuses in on the relevant parts of transcripts. For example,
applying a code for off-task as opposed to on-task verbal
behavior can remove irrelevant passages where the designers
talk office and personal gossip, make jokes, banter, and other
verbalizations not related to the task at hand. Another example
is that transcripts can be divided into episodes. An episode is a
chunk of segments that share a common theme (e.g., they all
concern planning the next meeting, or they all deal with
evaluating a particular prototype). By dividing transcripts into
episodes, certain types of episodes can be excluded from
further coding, in so far as they are irrelevant to the hypotheses
being tested. But obviously care should be taken in selecting
episodes for exclusion from data analysis, since this could
potentially raise doubts about whether the chosen subset of
data is a valid representation of the remainder of the
transcripts. The nature of in vivo data further requires that the
researcher pay particular attention to reliability analyses.
Reliability is important in any methodology studying design
cognition of course, but may be particularly important in in
vivo data because of the somewhat high degree of contextual
variance (as opposed to the relative contextual stability in
experimental settings). Inter-rater reliability checks of
individual codes using independent coders should be conducted
using Cohen’s Kappa measures rather than the mere percent
agreement that some researchers have reported. Percent
agreement will make agreement seem much higher than
warranted especially when locating phenomena that are
relatively rare (‘needle-in-a-haystack’) in a large data set. Since
this is often the case in in vivo data, even an exceedingly high
percent agreement can be problematic. A satisfactory level of
inter-rater reliability using Cohen’s Kappa should be above

.70. Other types of reliabilities are also important; for example,
when possible it is a good idea to recode the same hypotheses
using a different coding scheme and grain size (assumed to tap
into the same hypotheses), to see if the in vivo results holds up
[e.g., 5]. As can be gathered by the above description, the data
analysis and coding part of in vivo research is extremely labor
intensive.
EXAMPLE: MENTAL SIMULATION AND UNCERTAINTY
IN REAL-WORLD DESIGN

The move from hypotheses to coding scheme is difficult to
describe in general terms and the issue is too complex to deal
with in this conference proceeding. Further, this part of in vivo
research is not much different from standard verbal protocol
studies, and so the reader is referred to Ericsson & Simon [20]
for more details. So instead of describing the process in general
terms, I will offer a concrete example of a coding scheme using
a few different types of codes from my own data of
engineering designers. These codes are from work in progress
and the codes have been selected for illustrative purposes,
meaning that the background of the hypotheses and the results
are not explained in detail. The main focus here is on the move
from hypothesis to coding scheme, and on providing examples
of codes that can be utilized.
The hypothesis to be tested, deals with the relation between
information uncertainty and mental models. A mental model is
a representation of some domain or situation that supports
understanding, reasoning, and prediction [23]. Mental models
rely on qualitative relationships, such as signs and ordinal
relationships, and relative positions [e.g., 22]. Relevant to
engineering design, mental models have been used to explain
human reasoning about physical systems, including devices
and mechanisms [35,25,24]. An important feature of mental
models is that they frequently permit mental simulation. A
mental simulation refers to the sense of being able to
dynamically ‘run’ a simulation internally to observe
functioning and outcome of a system or device. ‘Runnability’
implies a sense of being able to simulate system behavior and
predict outcomes even for situations where the subject has no
previous experience. This has been termed ‘mental simulation’,
‘mental model runs’ [23] and ‘conceptual simulation’ [38] –
and here these terms are used synonymously.
Mental model runs have some disadvantages as a thinking
strategy, notably inaccuracy and imprecision [23]. However,
the potential advantage of using mental model runs in design
include being able to reason about how physical systems will
operate under changed circumstances/with altered features,
without having to resort to actually physically constructing
such a system or device. This implies quick and cheap ways of
testing possible alternatives. This is particularly useful in
creative domains, such as science, art and design, where
uncertainty is an inescapable part of the problem space since
the task involves constructing novelty. Constructing novelty
implies moving into the beforehand unknown possibilities and
impossibilities of the subject matter [6]. There are multiple
ways of attempting to deal with the inherent uncertainty in
design, including experimentation and other data collection,
analogical thinking, and the actual construction of objects – but
mental model runs may be yet another way. Mental model runs
may help in the reasoning and thinking about such possibilities
and impossibilities, thus reducing some of the uncertainty
associated with design. Some support for this had been found
in the domain of science, where use of mental models has been
linked to information uncertainty and ambiguity. Trickett
[40,38] found that the majority of mental simulations in
scientific data analysis was used to evaluate hypotheses (i.e.,
an areas of scientific thinking fraught with uncertainty), and
argued that mental model runs were used as a strategy to help
resolve uncertainty. Mental simulations were used as

frequently as or more frequently than any other strategy, and
thus played a significant role in scientists’ consideration and
evaluation of hypotheses.
The present analysis was an attempt to extend this hypothesis
into the domain of engineering design to see if it would hold up
under different circumstances. The hypothesis being tested was
thus whether information uncertainty leads to mental model
runs as an attempt to reduce this uncertainty. The constructs to
be measured are thus ‘information uncertainty’ and ‘mental
simulations’.
The engineering design transcripts used as data were 9 hours of
video taken from the data collection described above as
‘subgroup product development meetings’ in the product
development department of a major company in medical
plastics. All 9 hours of data were from the same subgroup.
These 9 hours of video were transcribed and segmented
according to complete thought. The segmentation produced a
total of 7414 segments covering 7 different transcripts. Added
to the transcripts were information about design objects present
at the meeting to ease the coding of which design objects were
currently being referenced in the protocols.
A coding scheme was developed to first limit the data set to
product development in the here-and-now (i.e., reduce the
transcripts to include only relevant segments), and second, to
code for information uncertainty and mental model runs (we
will primarily focus on the second step). The first step of the
coding included coding for off-task verbalizations, segments
dealing with planning future meetings or data collection, and
segments dealing with referencing past meetings. The
percentages of the transcript of each of these codes were
reported above. This left 78% or 5806 segments of on-task
here-and-now design thinking and reasoning.
The second step involved coding for information uncertainty
and mental simulation.
Mental simulation

The code for mental simulations were adapted from Trickett’s
[40,38] coding scheme of scientists running mental models
during data analysis. A mental model run is a mentally
constructed model of a situation, phenomenon or object that
can be grounded in memory or in a mental modification of the
design objects currently present. This allows the designers to
think and reason about new possible states of the design object
and its perceptual qualities, features and functionality without
actually having to physically change the object. But mental
simulations do not just concern the technical aspects of the
design object, but can include a host of other types of
simulations of changed circumstance. One frequently occurring
type concerned simulating contextual shifts, such as end-user
behavior and preferences under changed circumstances (e.g.,
using a novel design object). The key feature in a mental
simulation is that it involves a simulation ‘run’ that alters the
representation, to produce a change of state [38]. This means
that the simulation is not merely a question asked (e.g.,
changing features or functions of the design object); it also
provides a kind of answer (e.g., will it work, how should it be
produced). Mental simulations thus represent a specific
sequence starting with creating an initial representation,
running the representation (it is modified by spatial
transformation where elements or functions are for example
extended, added or deleted), followed lastly by a changed
representation. These three elements (initial representation, run
and changed representation) are not mutually exclusive and can
occur in the same utterance/segment, although frequently they
will cover several segments. Each segment was coded as
‘mental simulation’ (1) or ‘no mental simulation’ (0).

Initial
representation

Run

Could
you
add
something so that you
couldn’t close this thing
because there would be
something in the way
when you try to fold this
way…
But if this thing goes this
way, then it is in a
position to allow the ear
to enter... But then I just
don’t know how it should
be folded… ’cause if it is
folded this way then it
will come out here…then
it should be folded
unevenly
some
how…You should fold it
oblique.

Changed
representation

It wouldn’t make any
difference one way or the
other. It would fold the
same way, and come out
on this side the same
way.

Example of a mental simulation

The mental simulation code is a qualitative code making it
quite time-consuming since there is no quick and dirty way of
identifying mental simulations in a transcript. The coders must
code each segment in turn, noting elements of mental
simulations as they go along. Further, the code requires that the
coder understands much of the context for each segment,
meaning that it is necessary to know about design and about
what is being developed in this particular design transcript.
But past research has yielded high inter-rater reliability for this
code.
Information uncertainty

To illustrate different kinds of codes, two different measures of
information uncertainty will be used, one relying on syntax, the
other on a combination of verbal and visual information taken
from the video.
Information uncertainty using syntax. One way to code for
uncertainty is to use a purely syntactical approach. This
approach was adapted from [41] who used hedge words to
locate segments displaying uncertainty. These hedge words
included for example words like ‘probably’, ‘sort of’, ‘guess’,
‘maybe’, ‘possibly’, ‘don’t know’, ‘[don’t] think’, ‘[not]
certain’, ‘believe’ and so on. Segments containing these hedge
words were located and coded as ‘uncertainty present’ (1) if a
scrutiny of the individual segment confirmed that the hedge
word concerned uncertainty.
All other on-task here-and-now segments were coded as ‘no
uncertainty’ (0). Syntactical codes are quite easy to apply, but
they can only be applied to a limited number of categories.

Utterance

Code

’Cause I’m not sure whether you
would fold it around the back.

Uncertain

I think so too, but before we get too
cocky, let’s make a model…

Uncertain

Well, I guess it’s a combination of
moist and heat isn’t it? I suppose it
has to be.

Uncertain

It has to push from the start

Not uncertain

Yes, but the problem is that you
can’t hit it later …‘cause its too
small

Not uncertain

It...then we have...then we loose the
possibility of folding it back.

Not uncertain

Examples of information uncertainty using syntax

Information uncertainty using verbalizations and video in
combination. A different way of approaching the measure of
information uncertainty is to look specifically at the objects of
design thinking, or ‘pre-inventive structures’ [21]. These
objects can take many different forms, including prototypes,
sketches, mock-ups, or simply be ideas that are unsupported by
external representations (neither in 3d physical form or on
paper). It could be argued that these different kinds of design
objects have different degrees of information uncertainty, in
that they represent different levels of specification of the
concept in question. In that line of thinking, an idea left
unsupported by sketches or prototypes is more ‘uncertain’ than
the prototype where technical features and functions are much
more specified. Ideas, sketches and prototypes are all
‘ambiguous’ in a general sense in that they can be reinterpreted
and changed somewhat rapidly, and in the sense that they
represent an object-in-the-making, rather than a finished form.
But the ambiguity and uncertainty may be somewhat less for
prototypes than for ideas, with sketches somewhere in
between. Sketches primarily support visual representation but
is less specified in other modalities (haptic, gustatory,
olfactory, and auditory). Therefore in design, we would expect
that experts working with external support systems of
sketching and prototypes would be facing less artifact
uncertainty, than when no such external support exists (‘idea
only’). Further, sketching would provide more uncertainty than
prototypes. Thus, another way of measuring information
uncertainty is to code for the kind of design object being
referenced. In the present transcript three different kinds of
design objects occurred frequently: Prototypes, sketches and
‘ideas’ (i.e., objects of design thinking that were unsupported
by external representation). This distinction is referred to as
‘type of preinventive structure’ below. Included in the
transcripts were information about the design objects present at
each meeting (sketches, prototypes etc.). For each segment it
was first coded whether the focus of attention of the person
speaking was one of these design objects present in the room.
This was coded using the video recording of the design session
(not the verbal data). Focus of attention was operationalized as
either actual handling or holding a particular object; pointing to
a particular object; or gazing toward a particular object (if this
was possible to discern from the video). In effect the ‘focus of
attention’ code acted as a helping variable in coding type of
preinventive structure. Then coders coded whether each
segment of the verbal data referred to an ‘idea’ (1), sketch (2),
prototype (3) or other (4-removed from analysis), aided by the
‘focus of attention’ variable. Note it is of course perfectly

possible to look or handle one type of object and think about
another. In all cases the verbalized objects had precedent,
meaning that if there was a difference between referenced
object between focus of attention and verbalization, the object
from the verbalization was chosen. Coding the preinventive
structure variable was quite time consuming given that both
video analysis and then verbal protocol analysis were required,
but ‘focus of attention’ from the video data greatly aided the
coding of the verbal protocols since most of the segments had a
synchronicity between focus of attention and verbal reference.
Reliability

Following coding various forms of reliability were conducted.
Inter-rater reliability was done on 17% of the data (two full
transcripts), with all disagreements resolved by discussion. All
inter-rater reliability tests reached satisfactory Kappa values.
The syntactical uncertainty measure and the mental simulation
codes both had exceedingly high Kappa values (>.90). Further,
two split-half reliability analyses were conducted to test for
ordering effects. Each transcript was split in half, and all
analyses were re-done using the first halves and second halves
separately. The transcripts were then rank ordered in terms of
data collection date, and the first half of the transcripts were
separated from the last half of the transcripts, and analyses
were re-done on each of these halves. All split-half reliability
tests yielded comparable results.
Results

The results revealed that mental simulations were extremely
common in engineering design.
Chi-squares analyses revealed that segments containing
syntactical information uncertainty had significantly more
mental simulations than segments without uncertainty,
supporting the hypothesis that information uncertainty and
mental model runs are linked. Another chi-square showed
significant differences between ideas, sketches and prototypes.
Subsequent 2x2 chi-squares revealed that idea and sketches did
not differ, but both had significantly more mental model runs
than prototypes. These results converge to lend support to the
hypotheses that a link exists between information uncertainty
and mental model runs in real-world engineering design. The
link was strong enough to show up using two different codes
for uncertainty under naturalistic circumstances in real-world
design, thus demonstrating a strong and psychologically
meaningful effect. However, since these results are
correlational in nature we cannot draw any firm conclusions as
to causality. We thus need more research before we can
conclude that mental model runs are used as a strategy to
reduce information uncertainty in design. The present results
suffer from possible sampling biases in that only a small
number of sessions and subjects were involved. More research
both in vivo and in vitro should be conducted to replicate these
findings.
An important advantage in using in vivo research is the fact
that the data is not collected in order to test one particular
hypothesis, but rather can be used to test a range of hypotheses.
The nature of the data collection allows for an infinite number
of re-codings of the transcribed data. These re-codings can
concern finer grained analyses of the same or similar
hypotheses using different codes. But the same set can also be
used again in testing other hypotheses about thinking and
reasoning in concept design, for example concerning
analogical thinking, aesthethics, design planning and so on. In
the domain of science this can be illustrated in the works of
Susan Trickett and colleagues. They collected data on scientific
data analysis in the domains of physics, astronomy and
cognitive psychology, and used the same data sets to analyze
hypotheses about conceptual simulation when evaluating

hypotheses [40], anomalies in data analysis [42], and change of
representation in visual data analysis [39].
Due to the extensive data analysis and coding involved, in vivo
research will typically involve only relatively few hours of
recordings to be analyzed. Further, for the same reasons,
usually a rather small number of different contexts are studied.
This limited data variance and data amount can potentially
threaten the generalizability of the results, due to increased risk
of sampling error and low N problems. Therefore, as
mentioned, Dunbar recommends supplementing the in vivo
research with in vitro controlled experiments that can better
deal with these sampling and low N issues. These issues aside,
in vivo research remains particularly suited to tackle the lack of
ecological validity in some design cognition research.
CONCLUSION

The in vivo methodology holds promise to improve on some of
the limitations of typical design cognition methodologies. In
vivo research attempts to study design thinking and reasoning
‘live’ or ‘online’ as it takes place in the real world. In
engineering design, it is argued that subgroup product
development meetings may be suitable objects of study, in that
pilot studies in multidisciplinary design teams reveal that the
content includes a broad cross section of design activities in
general, and because design thinking and reasoning occupies
the majority of the time at these meetings. By recording
verbalizations at such meetings (or other suitable objects of
study) in the real world, transcribing, segmenting and coding
the data, it is possible to test hypotheses about design cognition
in the real-world. In contrast to more traditional design
methodologies, this approach has some advantages. In vivo
methodology captures design thinking and reasoning ‘live’ as it
occurs, as contrasted with some design methodologies focusing
on problematic retrospective data. Further, although in vivo
research sharesmuch of the data analysis features of protocol
analysis it avoids the problematic forced verbalizations
typically used in verbal protocol studies. Rather, in vivo
research relies on natural dialogue taking place between
designers. While the typical protocol study takes place in an
experimental lab setting, in vivo research focuses on real world
design with expert designers working on their normal tasks, in
their usual context and using personalized tools, working with
their regular network and teams, over extensive periods of
time. This ensures that in vivo design research will prove to
have a much better ecological validity than standard
experimental and protocol design research. However, in vivo
design is not without problems. It can be somewhat
problematic due to the labor intensive data analysis and coding
issues, which may put in vivo research at risk of sampling
errors and low N problems, if too few cases are subjected to
analysis. To reduce this potential threat to the generalizability
of the results, it is recommended that in vivo research is
supplemented with standard experimental lab studies that may
add experimental rigor and significantly increase the number of
analyzed cases.
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